

8. General Conclusions of the Report

8.1. Recent Demographic Evolution of the Brazilian Population

- Between 1995 and 2006, the resident population (except in the rural areas of the North region) grew 20.5%, that is, at a geometric mean growth rate of 1.33% per year. Analyzing according to groups, there was an annual growth in the white population of 1.26%, and 1.38% in the black & brown.
- From 1995 to 2006, the relative weight of the white population declined from 55.4% in 1995 to 49.7% in 2006, a decrease of 5.7 percentage points. On the other hand, the black & brown population increased in relative terms, from 45% to 49.5%, showing signs that it could become the majority in the next few years.
- These data reiterate the conclusions Petruccelli (2002) reached, who, in a study involving self-declarations of colour or race in the 2000 Census, had already pointed towards an increase in the proportion of persons who described themselves as black. However, this survey showed that as much the percentage of blacks as that of browns, grew in the period 1995 - 2006.
- The fact the self-declared white population no longer represents the absolute majority of the residents bears historical significance. The last time such a fact was observed by the official statistical organs was in 1890, when the census informed that the whites totalled around 35% of the population.
- In 1995, the relative weight of blacks & browns aged 10 - 29 was 47.8%. In 2006, eleven years later, this same contingent occupied 50.4% of the total population. Such a phenomenon seems to express that the reduction in relative weight of the whites in the population reflected as much the movements that had taken place on the demographic plane as recent reorientations with regard to self-perception of skin colour or race that have taken place in Brazilian society.
- In 2006, the white population was concentrated primarily in the South and Southeast, which, together, accounted for 73% of this contingent. The blacks & browns resided with greater intensity in the Northeast (39.3%) and Southeast (34.6%). The black & brown population were the majority in 3 of the 5 geographical regions: North (75.4%), Northeast (70.4%) e Centre-West (56.2%). In the Southeast and South, the relative weight of the blacks & browns were, respectively, 40.2% and 19.7%.
- The profile of the black & brown population was younger than that of the white population. In 2006, of the black & brown residents, 28.2% were aged up to 14, and 5.7% were over 65. Among the whites, those under 14 and over 65 were, respectively, 23.8% and 8.4%. During the period 1995 - 2006, an increase in the average age of Brazilians occurred, which was also expressed in each colour or racial group. The median age of the whites increased from 26 to 30, and that of blacks & browns, from 21 to 26.
- Throughout the period of analysis, there was a fall in the fertility rate, as measured by the number of children per woman in the reproductive age range 15 - 49. In 1995, among white women, it was 2.2, and among their black & brown counterparts, 3.0. In 2005, this indicator registered 1.88 among whites (a 14.5% decline), and 2.25, among blacks & browns (a 25% fall). Thus, the fertility rate for blacks & browns, fell from 33.3% higher than that of whites, to 19.7%. It is also worth emphasizing that the fertility rate for whites is already below the level for population replacement.
- Analysis of the age pattern of the fertility of blacks & browns revealed persistence of greater weight in the younger age range (15 - 24), accounting for 46.5% of the total in 2005. Among whites, the same indicator showed 38.4%. These indicators suggest that, in terms of colour or race, there was an unequal incidence of interventions to control and decelerate population growth, mainly those involving sterilization. Such a hypothesis is reinforced by the fact that, as a definitive method, the younger the women at the time of the operation, the younger the fertility pattern (SIMÕES, 2006).
- From 1995 to 2005, the infant mortality rate – up to one year old – declined from 37.6 to 23.7 per thousand live births (a 37% fall). This movement is associated to a fall in the asymmetries of colour or race in this period. Among the white contingent, the indicator changed from 27.1 to 19.4 (a 28.4% fall). In the case of the blacks & browns, the infant mortality rate declined from 47.3 to 24.4 (a 48.4% fall). Thus, the infant deaths in the latter group, which, in 1995, was 74.5% higher than that of whites, declined to 25.8% higher, in 2006.
- The infant mortality rate (up to age 5) also declined from 1995 to 2005: from 47.2 to 28.6 thousand live births. Among white children, the fall was from 32.9 to 23.1 (a 30% reduction), whereas among blacks & browns, the rate plummeted from 60.6 to 29.4 (a 51.5% reduction). Thus, this inequality of colour or race in the indicator shifted from 84.2% to 27.3%.

➤ The positive evolution of these indicators, including in terms of the asymmetries of colour or race, was made possible by investment in health, above all in preventive and curative medicine, as well as in basic sanitation, and, more recently, the accompaniment of pregnancy, birth and puerperium (6-week post-natal period). It is worth stressing the particular incidence of these measures in the North and Northeast regions, the poorest in the country (SIMÕES, 2003). Allied to these factors, the reduction in fertility also played an important role.

➤ Despite recent advances, mortality rates are still not down to desirable levels, above all among the black & brown population, especially in the Northeast and North, where even the indicators for the white population are high. The infant mortality rates in Brazil are well above those recorded in other Latin American countries, such as Cuba, with 6.1 deaths per thousand live births; Chile, 8; and Argentina, 15. In 2005, outside the Americas, Japan, considered the country with the lowest mortality levels, presented a rate of 3.2.

➤ Life expectancy in Brazil, accompanying the reductions observed in infant mortality, also evolved positively between 1995 and 2005, increasing from 68.2 to 72.5 years. In 1995, the life expectancy according to skin colour was 71.6 for whites and 65.9 for blacks & browns. In 2006, the same indicators were 74.9 and 71.7, respectively. Thus, the gap in life expectancy between the two groups was narrowed from 5.6 to 3.2 years.

➤ From 1995 to 2006, the percentage of exogamous unions increased throughout the country. Among white household heads there was a rise of 6.2 percentage points; among blacks, 12.5; and, among browns, 3.9.

8.2. Profile of the Mortality of the Brazilian Population Aged Over 5 Years

➤ In 2005, the mortality rate per 100 thousand white inhabitants was higher than that for blacks & browns, in both sexes. When broken down into groups of causes of death (ref. W.H.O. International Classification of Diseases), among men, the only two causes in which the rate for blacks & browns were higher than for whites were external, respectively, 124.6 and 102.8 deaths per 100 thousand, and, in the ill-defined group (in fact, a false cause of death), 63.6 and 53.4. The same occurred for women, as the rates for external causes in the case of blacks & browns was 45.7, and 24 for whites. For the ill-defined category, they were 45.7 for blacks & browns, and 24 for whites.

➤ When using a breakdown according to age groups, the mortality rate per 100 thousand black & brown inhabitants was higher than that of the whites in the age range 10 - 40. In the case of women, the mortality rate of the blacks & browns was higher than that of whites in the age range 25 - 40. This characteristic was strongly associated to the mode of incidence of the mortality, that is, external causes in the two contingents, and their particular concentration among blacks & browns.

➤ Throughout the chapter, one could hypothesize that the understatements in the mortality records of the Sistema de Informação de Mortalidade - SIM do DATASUS [DATASUS Mortality Information System] of the Ministry of Health, tended to occur with greater frequency in the black & brown contingent. This was caused by the fact this group was the majority in the population segments where the problem was most acute: states of the North and Northeast regions, children, the rural population, and the poorest contingent. In the same manner, mortality by ill-defined causes was a stronger characteristic among the blacks & browns. For these reasons, the mortality rate of blacks & browns, of both sexes, was so often lower than that of whites.

➤ The median age of death of black & brown men and women was lower than that of the contingents of the respective gender groups in all the causes of mortality that had been selected.

➤ In 2005, the principal causes of mortality among white men (29.3%), white women (34.6%) and black & brown women (33.4%) were cardiovascular. On the other hand, among the black & brown men, the main causes were external (25%).

➤ In the same year, the mortality rates due to some selected types of cardiovascular disease (hypertension, cardiological and cerebrovascular ailments) were greater among the whites than among the blacks & browns, in both sexes. However, in the period, 2000 - 2005, the rates for these causes among the blacks & browns, with a single exception, grew more than among the whites. Males: hypertension (47.7%, blacks & browns; 37.2%, whites); heart diseases (12.3% and 2.9%); cerebrovascular diseases (9.2% and 2.2%). Females: hypertension (34.9%, blacks & browns; 35.9%, whites); heart diseases (9.1% and 2.9%); cerebrovascular diseases (6.2% and 5.6%).

➤ Also, in 2005, 121,509 died due to non-natural causes, of whom 48.8% were blacks & browns, and 44.4%, whites. Among the white men, the most common causes were as follows: road accidents, 32.7%;

murder, 28.1%; other non-natural causes, 27.6%; suicide, 8.6%; and work accidents, 2.9%. Among the blacks & browns: homicides, 46.2%; road accidents, 24.2%; other non-natural causes, 22.2%; suicide, 5.4%; and work accidents, 1.8%. White women: other non-natural causes, 41%; road accidents, 34.6%; murder, 14.4%; suicide, 9.3%; and work accidents, 1%. Blacks & browns: other non-natural causes, 33.4%; road accidents, 31.8%; murder, 25.3%; suicide, 9%; and work accidents, 0.5%.

➤ From 1999 to 2005, the total number of murders in the whole country rose from 40.8 thousand to 45.7 thousand per year. The number of murders of blacks & browns grew 46.3%, having risen from 18.8 thousand to around 27.5 thousand. Among the whites, the number remained stable at 15.2 thousand. The relative weight of blacks & browns murdered grew from 46% to 60.2%.

➤ Between 1999 and 2005, in the whole country, there were 317,587 murders, 118,536 whites (37.3%) and 172,626 blacks & browns (54.4%). In this period, among the black & brown races there were 3.33 murders committed per hour, whereas, among the whites, the average was 31% lower, that is 2.29 per hour.

➤ The mortality rate due to homicide, between 1999 and 2005, grew among the black & brown men from 51.9 to 61.5 (18.4%). Among the whites, the indicator declined from 35.8 to 33.8, that is, by 5.6%. Among the black & brown women, the same indicator rose from 4 to 4.4 (a 10% rise), while, among the whites, from 3.3 to 3.5 (a 6.1% rise).

➤ The incidence of murder among the young, especially from 15 - 24, assumed characteristics of an epidemic, once again, highlighting its prevalence among the black & brown males. In 2005, the mortality rate due to this cause, in the same age range, among the black & brown men, was 134.22. Among young whites, it was 66.8 (less than half).

➤ From 2003 to 2005, in the whole country, there was a reduction in the mortality rate due to murder. However, this fall was greater among the white men than among blacks & brown males (respectively, 23.8% and 10.6%), and likewise among the white women compared to their black & brown counterparts (respectively, 9.6% and 4.7%).

➤ The mortality rate per 100 thousand male blacks & browns due to firearms, in 2005, was 45. Among their white counterparts, 24.2. In the case of women, blacks & browns, 2.5; whites, 1.8.

➤ From this information, it seems reasonable to affirm that violence, which greatly affects Brazilian society, principally the high incidence of homicide, presents a clear colour or race component. Besides this, the recent reductions in homicide rates were not shared equally by the white and black & brown contingents. There was, in fact, increased inequality between the two groups. The majority of the murders, from 1999 to 2005, were committed with firearms, and the traditional differences related to colour or race and gender were maintained. Again, the blacks & browns constituted the largest group of victims.

➤ There exists an association between this empirical reality and the Referendum on the Prohibition of Firearm and Ammunition Sales (Article 35, Disarmament Statute), held in 2005, the response to which was 65.3% of the votes against the proposal. Among so many arguments, the defenders of an arms sale ban/disarmament of the common citizen left aside the inequality in the incidence of murder by firearms between whites and blacks & browns. In other words, if it is true that firearms are made to kill (the protection argument would be wrong, as defence against violence does not require citizens to be armed), in Brazil, this type of weapon is used most frequently against the lives of blacks. Ultimately, the issue is: to what extent did concealment of this issue contribute to undermining the power of persuasion of those who had fought against disarmament?

➤ The mortality rate due to road accidents of whites exceeded that of blacks & browns throughout the period under study. Thus, in the last year of this period, the respective rates were: 15.8 and 14.5. However, when the indicators of deaths by being run over are analysed, the picture is the opposite, the main victims are blacks & browns. In 2005, the mortality rate of this group due to this cause was 5.5, while that of whites was 5.03, that is, 8.5% lower. Thus, for the whites, there were greater probabilities of being killed as a motorist or passenger, whereas for blacks & browns, it was as a pedestrian.

➤ More whites committed suicide than blacks & browns. In the two groups of colour or race, the rate for men exceeded that for women. In 2005, the mortality rate for suicide was: white men, 9.03; black & brown men, 6.13; white women, 2.22; and black & brown women, 1.57. However, from 2000 to 2005, there occurred a greater increase in the suicide rate among blacks & browns than among whites: white men, 11.5%; black & brown men, 27.4%; white women, 15.6%; and black & brown women, 33.1%. The age ranges in which these extreme acts were committed also presented

differences. Among black & brown men and women, the rates were respectively, 65.3% and 70.4%, occurring up to age 40, whereas among white men and women, this age range corresponded to 50.3% and 53.2% of cases, respectively.

➤ From 1999 to 2005, almost 500 persons in the whole country died of drug overdose. Of these, 4.6% were blacks & browns, 38.4% were whites, and 14.1% had neither their colour nor race identified.

➤ Tuberculosis used to be a disease that affected blacks & browns with higher frequency. In 2005, the mortality rate for this disease was: black & brown men, 4.4; white men, 3.06; black & brown women, 1.7; and white women, 1.0. Thus, the difference of blacks & browns in relation to whites was 43.8% among men, and 70% among women. From 1999 to 2005, reductions occurred in the mortality by tuberculosis. However, this took place with greater intensity among whites (men, 22.7% and women, 16%) than among blacks & browns (men, 6% and women, 6.1%);

➤ In 2005, throughout the country, the mortality from HIV/Aids showed more victims among white men than any other group. Thus, the mortality rates due to this cause were: white men, 9.7; black & brown men, 7.0; white women, 4.0; and black & brown women, 3.92. However, from 1999 to 2005, a more intense growth in mortality occurred among blacks & browns than among whites: white men, 0.7%; black & brown men, 20.4%; white women, 27.7%; and black & brown women, 44.1%.

➤ In the analysis of the mortality due to diseases typically occurring among the poor population, throughout the country, in 2005, it was revealed that, in absolute numbers, the whites were more affected by viral hepatitis (65.8%) and viral fevers (55.6%). White men formed the modal group of mortality from leptospirosis (39.7%), and white women, from intestinal infections (28.2%). On the other hand, the blacks & browns corresponded to the absolute majority of deaths from malaria (60.6%), leprosy (58.3%), leishmaniosis (58.1%), schistosomiasis (55.5%) and diphtheria (50%). The black & brown men constituted the modal group of deaths from tetanus (35.9%), Chagas disease (26.4%) and dengue fever (26.1%).

➤ From 1999 to 2005, the mortality rate during pregnancy, birth or puerperium of black & brown women remained higher than that of their white counterparts. In the last year of this period, the respective rates were 2.19 and 1.27. Thus, in

proportional terms, the black & brown women died from this cause with 72.4% greater frequency, having increased from a level of 43.2% in 2000. This same asymmetry was also found in all the selected age ranges: 10 - 14, 80%; 15 - 17, 64%; 18 - 24, 71.8%; 25 - 40, 56.9%; and 41 - 60, 102.9%.

➤ On the basis of SIM data, it was possible to identify some causes of deaths specific to pregnancy, birth or puerperium that were suggestive of illegal abortion. From 1999 to 2005, there were 565 cases, the black & brown women forming the absolute majority, with 50.6%. The rest were divided among white women, with 34.7%, and those of other skin colours or races (yellow and indigenous) or of unstated colour/race, 14.7%. Thus, it seems that this practice, restricted by the Brazilian legislation, could be analysed in the light of this information, as the black & brown women are the main victims of illegal abortions, often performed under quite precarious conditions.

➤ It was also observed that the mortality rate due to undefined causes was greater among blacks & browns than among whites. Upon closer analysis, it was perceived that the reason for this difference was absence of medical assistance. In 2005, the mortality rates due to false causes were: black & brown men, 32.5; white men, 19.5; black & brown women, 24.0; white women, 14.2. Thus, the difference between blacks & browns and whites was: men, 66.7%; women, 69%. From these data, it can be deduced that the lack of medical assistance affects blacks & browns more. Such an empirical observation suggests a reflection on the Sistema Único de Saúde - SUS [National Health Service] itself and the way its deficiencies cause different impacts on colour or racial groups. Thus, it seems that upholding the constitutional precept of social security, that the health service, the right of all (now at risk of losing effectiveness), requires special attention to ensure that it attends the black & brown population, which, after all, is the contingent with the greatest probability of being excluded from the system. In other words, the policies for inclusion of afro-descendants in the health system, more than a focus of action within the scope of the public authorities, seem to be the most efficacious means to achieve its universalization.

➤ Between 1999 and 2005, 1,406 persons died of falciform anaemia. Of these, 62.3% were identified as blacks & browns. It was also observed that the mortality from this disease grew 46.1% in the period: among blacks & browns, 119.4%; among whites, 46.4%. This evolution may be related to a real increase in incidence, as well as to awareness campaigns promoted by the

health authorities or Black Movement activists, thereby making identification of the disease more common.

➤ More white than black & brown men die of alcohol-related liver diseases. From 1999 to 2005, the respective figures were 22,376 and 14,782. However, when the female group was analysed, the direction of the asymmetry was altered, the number of black & brown women being greater than that of white women. Thus, in the same period, 2,649 black & brown women and 2,277 white women died of alcohol-related liver diseases. In 2005, the mortality rate of white men due to this cause was 24.9% higher than that of blacks & browns. However, in the case of women, the mortality rate of blacks & browns was 36.9% higher than that of whites.

➤ Regarding the evolution of the indicators of the respective colour or racial groups, it is appropriate to make a final remark valid for the set of data analysed. As verified in the example of mortality by falciform anaemia, it cannot be said the general trend of deepening inequalities, observed in various mortality indicators, arises from evolution alone, from the incidences of mortality in the population and its distinct contingents (thus reflecting unequal declines in the quality of life of the different groups). It is necessary to point out that such movement may also have been a consequence of improvements in the information collection systems, including derivation for different colour or racial groups and gender, which began to provide evidence of more aspects of the reality already in existence, rather than deepening the asymmetries. Even though it is a formal matter - as, in both cases, it points out differences in colour or race existing in some form - it is of great importance, especially, when one aims to study the long term trends of the mortality indicators. In the meantime, lacking the means to provide the full picture, what one can indicate is: if in fact the mortality indicators of whites and blacks & browns evolved in divergent directions, on various occasions and with unequal intensities, the motives for such behaviour would require more detailed studies, including in the light of other indicators in the health area.

➤ The indicators studied in this chapter do not exhaust the range of questions potentially suggested by the Sistema de Informação de Mortalidade - SIM data. Here certain causes of mortality were selected for their social relevance, knowing in advance that some of strong impact on the population were hardly mentioned or not at all (for example, neoplasias, diseases in the perinatal period, mental and behavioural disturbances, among others). It is also evident that the white population in particular are victims of specific causes of mortality,

which deserve equally careful attention on the part of the authorities of the sector. What is expected, therefore, is that these data can assist clarification of aspects of this reality, as well as determination of investment and measures in the health sector, so that, one day, differences in colour or race, whether in the act of living or dying, will come to an end.

8.3. Inequalities in Access to the Educational System

➤ Throughout Brazil, in 2006, there were 14.4 million illiterate, aged 15 or over. Of this total, 4.6 million were whites (32%) and 9.7 million blacks & browns (67.4%). From 1995 to 2006, discounting the contingent who resided in rural areas of the North region, a fall of 24.7% occurred in the number of illiterate in the whole country. The proportional reduction among the whites was 22.8%, and among the blacks & browns, 24.8%.

➤ Comparing the indexes of illiteracy of those aged 15 or over, in the period, 1995 - 2006, there was also a reduction in the difference between the illiteracy rates between the group of blacks & browns and the group of whites. In the first group, the index dropped from 23.5% to 14.6%, and in the latter, from 9.6% to 6.5%. However, in 2006, the difference was still accentuated: the illiteracy of blacks & browns was proportionally 124.6% higher than that of whites.

➤ In relation to functional literacy - defined as the number of persons aged 15 or over with 4 or more complete years of study - from 1995 to 2006, in the whole country, there was an advance of 9 percentage points among whites (from 74.2% to 83.2%), and 16.8 percentage points among blacks & browns (from 54.3% to 71.1%), showing a tendency for inequalities to be reduced.

➤ From 1995 to 2006, in the population aged 15 or over, among whites, there occurred an increase of 1.6 years of study (rising from 6.4 to 8.0), and, among blacks & browns, 1.9 years (from 4.3 to 6.2). Thus, in 2006, the average schooling of blacks & browns still had not reached the complete fundamental level.

➤ Between 1995 and 2006, there occurred a small reduction in the difference in average numbers of whites over 15 years in relation to blacks & browns of the same age: from 2.1 to 1.8 years of study. Thus, the average annual growth rate in number of years of schooling was 1.03 among whites and 1.06 among blacks & browns. However, the fall in the differences between the two

groups has been occurring very gradually. At this pace, the inequalities would not cease in less than 17 years.

➤ It was confirmed that women had been studying more than men, a reality present in all colour or racial groups. In 1995, in the population over 15, the average number of years of study of the respective contingents were: white men, 6.4; white women, 6.4; black & brown men, 4.1; and black & brown women, 4.4. In 2006, the same indicators had advanced, respectively, to 7.9; 8.1; 6.0 and 6.4 years of study.

➤ In the period from 1995 to 2006, the rates of schooling for women, measured by a series of indicators, were higher than those for men of both colour and racial groups. This shift is a reflection of the behavioural and political alterations in Brazilian society over the last few decades. It is a fact that caused an alteration of the traditional roles exercised by the two gender groups and took women to distinct social spaces – such as classrooms – to the detriment of the domestic reproductive sphere. However, the gender advances regarding improvements in schooling averages for women are far from putting an end to old social stigmas. The dichotomy between the domestic sphere and the world of work is still very common, almost always generating in the latter, an incompatibility between qualification and actual occupation. This problem is particularly serious for black & brown women. This issue was covered in detail in Chapter 5, dedicated to the study of labour market dynamics.

➤ Among children aged 4 to 6, the coverage level of the school system (crèche, pre-school and early primary school years), between 1995 and 2006, leapt from 56.3% to 78.4% in the white group, and from 50.5% to 74%, in that of blacks & browns.

➤ In the same period, for children aged 7 - 14, with almost complete universalization of the educational system for this age range, the racial inequalities practically ended. In this age range, the coverage of the educational system, has increased, in the case of white children, from 94.6% to 98.8%, and in that of black & brown children, from 88.2% to 97.7%.

➤ Among youths aged 15 - 17, the rates of coverage by the educational system evolved as follows: among whites, from 71%, in 1995, to 85.1%, in 2006, and, among blacks & browns, from 62% to 79.6%. Read in a different way, of this age contingent, in the last year of the period, 14.9% of the whites and 20.4% of the blacks & browns were not at school.

➤ From 1995 to 2006, the gross fundamental education rate, in the whole country, fell from 117.7% to 114.3% in the contingent, colour or white race, but rose from 109% to 121.9% in the colour or black & brown race. Thus, this indicator was one of the few that appeared to show improved living conditions for blacks & browns, as compared to whites. This indicator thus reveals the unprecedented large scale entry of blacks & browns into the educational system. But it reflects the presence of a reasonable portion of this population, with ages above normal for the respective academic levels, and in a greater proportion than among whites who also attend the school.

➤ In fundamental education, the net schooling rates displayed a converging trend among colour or racial groups. Thus, in 1995, the rate was 90.2% among white children and 80.8% among blacks & browns. 11 years later, the same indicator for whites showed a rise to 95.8%, and, for blacks & browns, to 94.3%.

➤ The net schooling rate in intermediate education also presented increases in the period, with a reduction in the inequalities between the two contingents in the respective 11-year period. Among young whites, the rise was from 32.6% to 59.1% (an 81.3% increase in educational coverage), and among blacks & browns, it more than tripled, leaping from 12.1% to 37.8%. Anyway, it should be stressed that 40.9%, of the whites, and 62.2%, of the blacks & browns, aged 15 - 17, did not attend the appropriate educational level.

➤ In the first stage of the fundamental level (age range 7 - 10), the rates of appropriate age match to the educational system, in 1995, were 52.5% among whites and 30.7% among blacks & browns. In 2006, the respective rates were 62.2% and 52.3%. In other words, there occurred a significant reduction in the differences, but the situation of black & brown children was practically the same as that of white children 11 years earlier. Of these data one can also see that a little over half the black & brown children, aged 7 - 10, studied at the correct level.

➤ In 2006, not even half of the children aged 11 - 14 attended school at the right level, including among whites. However, the situation was even worse among the blacks & browns, only a third being placed at the correct level.

➤ At the intermediate educational level from 1995 to 2006, the rates of proper matching of level of those aged 15 to 17 also grew, but, nevertheless, remained low. Thus, among white youths, the rate rose from 17.7% to

37.4%. In the case of black & brown youths, this indicator leapt from an insignificant 4.9% to 19.3%.

➤ From 1995 to 2006, in the first stage of the fundamental level, in the whole country, the efficiency rate of the educational system rose from 50.2% to 70.2% in the white population, and from 26.5% to 57.9% in the black & brown. Thus, at the end of the period, 47.1% of the black & brown population in the first stage presented a school level mismatch, while among the whites this percentage was 29.8%.

➤ From 1995 to 2006, the efficiency rate in the second stage of the fundamental level increased from 38.2% to 56.9% among white children, and from 19.2% to 38.5% among blacks & browns. Thus, in 2006, of the total number of students in the 5th and 8th series of fundamental education, 43.1% of the whites were overage, and this occurred with over 60% of the blacks & browns.

➤ In intermediate education, the efficiency rate, from 1995 to 2006, increased from 35% to 48.2% among whites, and from 17.3% to 29% among blacks & browns. Thus, in relative terms, the inequalities of colour or race decreased in the period. However, in 2006, the number of overage students exceeded 70% of the total blacks & browns, whereas the same mismatch affected 51.8% of whites.

➤ In the comparative analysis of exam marks by the Sistema Nacional de Avaliação da Educação Básica - SAEB [National Basic Education Evaluation System], organized by the Ministry of Education, it is observed that, at all school levels, in both sexes and in all years of application of the tests, the white students obtained better results than the blacks & browns. Thus, in 2003, in the mathematics exam, the white students' marks were 7.5%, 7.4% and 8% higher than those of blacks & browns, respectively at the fourth level of fundamental education, at the eighth level, and in the third year of intermediate education. However, among the students in the same year, the whites obtained higher marks than blacks & browns in the mathematics exam (7%, 9.3% and 23%, respectively), considering the aforementioned reference levels.

➤ In the same year, the differences were maintained in the Portuguese exam. Thus, the average marks of the white students were higher than those of the blacks & browns by 7.5%, 7.4% and 5.5%, respectively at the same reference levels. On the other hand, among the females, the whites taking the same exam also obtained average marks that were higher by 5.4%, 7.2% and 7.3%.

➤ Analysis of the evolution of the level of proficiency of white and black & brown children and youths, of both sexes, in the SAEB mathematics and Portuguese exams, from 1995 to 2003, also reveals data that give cause for concern. With the sole exception of the result obtained by whites in the third year of intermediate education in the mathematics exam (whose average mark increased 1.1%), in all cases reductions occurred in the average marks in 2003 in comparison to those of 1995.

➤ From reading the indicators generated by SAEB, between 1995 and 2003, it is seen that the Brazilian educational system combined a major expansion in the number of school places with a corresponding loss of quality. In this case, the general trend of the indicators of colour or racial inequalities was more towards constancy than reduction. Finally, this question is associated as much to problems of supply (poorly qualified the teachers in pedagogic terms and lacking in knowledge of subject matter, besides bad classroom conditions and the school as a whole), as to demand (arising from the massive influx of students into the school system fraught with the most varied problems), though it presented unequal incidence among children and youths of the distinct colour or racial groups, with particular loss for blacks & browns. This suggests that children and adolescents of this latter colour or racial group face additional obstacles for development of their studies, consisting of racial discrimination in the schools and manifested in different forms: discriminatory attitudes of teachers, other educational professionals and colleagues; textbooks that convey content with prejudice or that reinforce the invisibility of blacks; anthropocentric educational content and little receptivity to the perspective of diversity and multi-culturalism, etc.

➤ Between 1995 and 2006, in the whole country, the number of students who attended higher education increased: from 1,993,418 in 1995 to 5,872,940 in 2006. In the same period, the total number of university students of black & brown or white race rose from 1.5 million to 4.03 million. The result was a net positive balance of entry to university, totalling 2.53 million (a growth of 168.3%). Of these, 41.6% were males and 58.4% females. Among the contingent, coloured or black & brown race, the number of students in higher education rose from 341.24 thousand in 1995 to 1.76 million in 2006, resulting in a balance of 1.42 million (a growth of 415.0%). Of these, 41.7%, were males and 58.3% females.

➤ From 2002 to 2006, it is observed that, among whites, there was an increase of 17.4% in the number of

students at public universities and 31.1% in private ones. In the same period, among the black & brown contingent, there occurred a 31.4% increase in attendance of the public educational system and 124.5% in the private. The weight of blacks & browns in higher education also increased in relative terms. In 1995, 18.1% of the total number of university student were of the latter contingent, this index having increased from 29.9% in 2006. Although not an exclusive fact, it must be observed that this rise took place within the context of adoption of measures for inclusion of blacks & browns in the higher education institutions, such as, quotas in the public ones, and Programa Universidade Para Todos - PROUNI [University For All Program] and Fundo de Financiamento ao Estudante de Ensino Superior - FIES [Higher Education Student Finance] (both promoted by the Ministry of Education) in the private ones.

➤ During 1995 to 2006, the gross higher education attendance rate for the white population rose from 13.1% to 30.7%, whereas for blacks & browns, the rate rose from an insignificant 3.3% in 1995 to 12.1% in 2006. The net higher education attendance rate, between 1995 and 2006, rose from 9.2% to 19.5% among the white population, and from 2% to 6.3% among blacks and browns. In the period, the net higher education attendance rate doubled among whites and tripled among the blacks & browns. However, in 2006, of the total white youths of the right age to enter higher education, one in five was in a university. But among the black & brown youths of this same age range, over 93.7% were outside university, whether public or private. Thus, their net educational rate in 2006 was still lower than that observed in 1995 among white youths.

➤ The evolution of the education indicators of the respective colour or racial groups and gender show that the expansion of the educational system for the whole population had the capacity to reduce, albeit partially, the inequalities between both contingents. However, if it is quite true that the recent public policies for the educational area have contributed to the reduction in the colour or racial inequalities, it is also necessary to know how this happens and what its limitations are. If, on the one hand, the educational indicators of the blacks & browns have been heading into positive territory in the last few years – and at a faster pace than shown by the indicators for the whites, on the other hand, this evolution has taken place in a context in which the starting point for blacks & browns was markedly lower than that for whites.

➤ It is not a matter of removing the merit of the advances observed, but rather of pondering them in the perspective of the many that still have to be achieved. The distances are very great, despite the recent reduction in the asymmetries. Likewise, it is reasonable to suspect the maintenance of the pace of growth of the education indicators for blacks & browns in the future, without confronting the other factors that act towards the exclusion of black children and youths in the educational establishments. These elements may be synthesized in: ethnocentrism and racial discrimination. These vectors operate via more or less visible multiple mechanisms, but unequivocally contribute to the low educational performance of this colour or racial group. Recent measures, such as Law no. 10.639, may contribute positively, but such aspects do not appear to be occupying a more outstanding position on the agendas of the current formulators of public education policy.

8.4. Inequalities in the Dynamics of the Labour Market

➤ From 1995 to 2006, the Economically Active Population - EAP, discounting the population resident in the rural areas of the North region, presented a net entry into the employment market of 20.6 million. When colour or racial groups are considered, it is observed that, among the whites, the net figure was 7.7 million, while among blacks & browns, it was 12.6 million. Observing the evolution in absolute numbers, disaggregated by gender, it is seen that the contingent most responsible for the rise was women, who represented 56.4% of the occupied EAP growth. The black & brown women, alone, represented 6.4 million entries to the labour market. The black & brown men were responsible for a net increment of 6.3 million. Among white men and women, the net increases between 1995 and 2006, were respectively, 2.6 and 5.1 million.

➤ In the same period, among men, the black & brown EAP, in absolute numbers of workers, exceeded that of the whites. Thus, in 2006, the total number of occupied and unoccupied blacks & browns was 25.7 million, while for whites it was 25.6 million. In the case of women, the white EAP exceeded that of the blacks & browns by 2.59 million workers.

➤ From 1995 to 2006, the participation rates in the labour market of white and black & brown women grew, respectively, 7.0 and 4.4 percentage points. On the other hand, for the white and black & brown men, the same indicators declined, respectively, 1.4 and 2.2 percentage points.

➤ From 1995 to 2006, in the whole country, except the residents in the rural areas of the North region, the net entry of the EAP into the labour market reached 20.6 million. When disaggregated by colour or race and gender, the greatest proportional evolutions took place among women: 27.1% among the whites, and 42.7% among the blacks & browns. However, in the male EAP, the relative evolution of the number of occupied was 10.2% among the white men, and 30.0% among blacks & browns. In the total, the number of occupied in the period grew proportionally, by 17.1% among the whites, and 34.9% among the blacks & browns.

➤ From 1995 to 2006, the activity rate of the white population increased from 60.3% to 61.3%, while, in the black & brown contingent, it declined from 59.5% to 56.7%. In the male population, the rate fell 2.6 percentage points among the whites, and 5.9 among the blacks & browns. However, among the females, the opposite occurred, that is, increases, which, among the whites, was 4.4 percentage points, and, among the blacks & browns, 0.1 of a percentage point.

➤ In that same period, of the white population, over age 10, occupied in the labour market, the relative weight of those who presented, at most, an incomplete first stage of fundamental education, declined from 22.4% to 11.8%, while among the coloured or the black & brown race, it fell from 45.6% to 25.6%. Among those who were occupied in the labour market with at least a complete intermediate education, the white contingent proportion rose from 27.6% to 48.2%, while, among the blacks & browns, from 12.0% to 28.1%. Thus, the proportion of occupied blacks & browns with at least a complete intermediate education, in 2006, was equivalent to the situation of the whites in 1995, 11 years before. In the same manner, despite the percentage of occupied blacks & browns possessing higher education having practically doubled from 1.9% in 1995 to 3.7%, in 2006, the weight of those educated to this level, compared to the distribution of the occupied whites by educational level (13.5%), corresponded to less than one third of that of the whites.

➤ When analysing the profile of the white occupied male population, it was perceived that, in 2006, the main modalities of occupational positions were: private employment with the work card signed, along with the public employment: the civil service and military services, 45.7%; self-employed, 23.4%; private employment without the work card signed, 17.2%; employer status, 6.9%; and non-remunerated occupations, 3.6%. However, for the white occupied

female EAP, the main modalities were: salaried employment with the work card signed, and the civil service and military services, 42.9%; irregular employment, 13.5%; self-employed, 13.3%; domestic employment, 12.9%; and non-remunerated occupations, 7.4%.

➤ In the male black & brown occupied EAP, the most important occupational positions in 2006 were: regular private sector employees, civil servants & military personnel, 37.6%; self-employed, 24.7%; irregular employment, 25.2%; and non-remunerated occupations, 5.7%. In this contingent, domestic employment accounted for 1.1% of the occupied EAP, and employer status, 2.5%. On the other hand, in the female black & brown EAP, the relative weights were: regular private sector salaried employment along with the civil service and armed services, 29.5%; domestic employment, 21.8%; self-employed, 16.3%; non-remunerated occupations, 8.7%; and activities for own consumption, 10.1%. The status of employer corresponded to 1.4% of the black & brown EAP: 1.1% with five employees, and 0.3% with over five.

➤ The condition of regular salaried employment was more common among the white employees (36.8%) than the black & brown (28.5%); more frequent among white men (39.8%) than black & brown (33%); and also more prevalent among white women (33%) than their black & brown counterparts (22%). Irregular salaried employment was more common among black & brown men (25.2%) than whites (17.2%). Among women, the percentage of irregular salaried blacks & browns (14.2%) was slightly higher than that of whites of the same status (13.5%). Employment in the civil service or military services was a little more common among white women (9.9%) than black & brown women (7.5%), and more common among white men (5.9%) than their black & brown counterparts (4.6%).

➤ The relative weight of irregular employment in the occupied EAP, in the public and private sectors, was 25.8% for whites, that is 27.3% and 23.9% for the respective males and females. Among the salaried black & brown EAP in the public and private sectors, the relative weight of the irregular employees was 37.6%. Decomposing by gender, the weight corresponded to 40.1% males and 32.5% females. Thus, while the relative presence of whites represented 57.1% of the regular private employees and 57.8% of the civil servants, the blacks & browns represented 55.5% of the irregular employees.

➤ Domestic employment occupied more women than men, and more blacks & browns than whites. Thus, of the black & brown women, one in every five was a domestic employee (21.8%). The frequency of white women was 8.9 percentage points lower than that of blacks & browns. Among the black & brown domestic employees, irregular status was found among 63.6% of the men, 76.1% of the women, and 75.8% of the total occupied in this area. Among the whites who were domestic employees, 57.1% were men, 69.8% women, and represented 68.9% of the total. In the contingent of regular domestic employees, 53.8% were blacks & browns. In the total of irregular domestic employees, the weight of the black & brown men reached 3.3% and that of women of the same group, 58.2%.

➤ Domestic employment seems to be an occupation that seems to be particularly attractive to black & brown female labour, given that it is predominant. As mentioned above, it covers one in every five of this group in the employment market. For domestic servants, unlike other categories of occupation, do not have a guaranteed right to FGTS (service time benefit) and unemployment benefit. In fact, recent proposals for extension of these rights to this category, have met either with resistance or veiled complacency, from both ideological spectrums in Brazilian society. The argument commonly used is that middle class families cannot afford to pay decent remuneration, including the accompanying social contributions. Few voices were raised to remind that, in more socially developed countries, fixed full-time domestic employment (not to be confused with part-time domestic employment) is a practically non-existent modality, which is precisely because of the high value of the labour force. The development of Brazilian society is incompatible with the very existence of domestic employment as it occurs in the country today. There is no reason for such a disproportionate amount of the female labour force, composed particularly of black & brown women, to be concentrated in an activity that is so precarious and of such low prestige.

➤ Self-employment was relatively common, as much among whites (19.8%) as among blacks & browns (21.2%), with the difference that possession of a higher education diploma, though rather seldom, was five times more frequent among whites (2%) than blacks & browns (0.4%). Whereas 10.1% of the white self-employed possessed further education, this only occurred among 1.9% of the blacks & browns. Even though a diploma does not guarantee activity in the respective profession, it is nevertheless an indication of the different probabilities of link with the labour market. Thus,

among the self-employed with a complete higher education, 80.7% were whites, and 52.3%, blacks & browns.

➤ The status of employer was not common in either the colour or racial and gender groups. However, in the occupied black & brown EAP, this percentage was even lower: 2.5% among men, and 1.4% among women. With over five employees, these proportions fell to 0.5% for men and 0.3% for women. In the occupied white EAP, the status of employer was 6.9% among men, and 3.8% among women. With over five employees, respectively, 2.2% and 1%. Of the employers, the weight of those who employed over five employees was 30.4% among whites, and 20% among blacks & browns. Among males: 31.9% for whites, and 20% for blacks & browns. Of the female employers, 26.3% among the whites, and 21.4% among the blacks & browns. The relative weight of the coloured or white race group among the employers with up to five employees was 69.8%, and, among the employers with over five, 80.9% (58.8% were white men).

➤ Work for own consumption was almost six times more common among black & brown women (8.1%) than among white men (1.4%). Black & brown men were more likely to live from subsistence activities (2.5%) in a proportion 1.78 times higher than occupied white males (1.4%). Non-remunerated occupation was more common among women than men. In the case of black & brown women, the frequency was 8.7%, and white women, 7.4%. In the male EAP, the non-remunerated percentage was 5.7%, among blacks & browns, and 3.6%, among whites.

➤ In the spectrum of other informal occupations – construction for own benefit, production for own consumption and non-remunerated occupations, the relative weight of the black & brown EAP was 12%, and in the white, 8%. Among the black & brown women, these modalities represented 16.8% of the forms of occupation. Among the whites, this proportion was 11.6%. Among the white and black & brown men, these atypical forms of work represented, respectively, 5.1% and 8.5%. Thus, the relative weights of the black & brown workers were: 66.1% in construction activities for own use (55.7% of these were men), 63.2% among subsistence workers, and 55.3% among non-remunerated workers.

➤ From 1995 to 2006, in the whole country, there occurred a net increment of 3.6 million in the number of unoccupied. A large portion were female, that is, 68.4%. With disaggregation by colour or race and gender, the

blacks & browns represented 60.4% of that increment, 22.2% being men, and 40.2% women. The unoccupied white EAP, in turn, represented 38.3%, which, divided by gender, showed that 9.8% were men, and 28.5% women.

➤ In 2006, 54.1% of the unoccupied were blacks & browns, 23.9% being men, and 30.8% women. In 1995, the blacks & browns represented 48.6% of the total (25.3% men, 23.3% women).

➤ From 1995 to 2006, the unoccupied rate for the black & brown EAP grew at a proportionally more accentuated pace than that for the whites. Thus, in the period, the rate grew 0.8 of a percentage point among white men, while among blacks & browns, 1.5 of a percentage point. In the female contingent, among whites, the rate grew 3.1 percentage points, whereas, among blacks & browns, the growth was 4.5 percentage points. In other words, in the latter case, the growth among white men was over five times higher. Finally, in the comparison of the average for both groups, the unoccupied rate among whites rose from 5.8% to 7.7%, and among blacks & browns, from 6.2%, to 8.7%.

➤ In 2006, the average real monthly income from the main occupation of white men in the whole country was R\$1,164. This amount, was 56.3% higher than that of white women (R\$744.71); 98.5% higher than that earned by black & brown men (R\$586.26), and 200% higher than that earned by black & brown women.

➤ From 1995 to 2006, the inequalities of colour or race and gender, in terms of income, decreased gradually. Thus, the difference between white and black & brown men fell from 120.1% to 98.5%. In the female contingent, the reduction was from 107.8% to 91.8%. Finally, from 1995 to 2006, the asymmetries of earnings between whites and blacks & browns, of both sexes, fell from 113.9% to 93.3%.

➤ Such a movement took place despite the evolution of the inoccupation rates among the distinct contingents. This leads to the hypothesis that institutional factors, such as policies to raise the minimum salary in the period, may have attenuated the effects of another variable in the labour market that would lead to a compression of incomes. In fact, the value of the minimum salary showed positive movement in the period – a real increase of 63%, from May 1994 to May 2007, which may have generated effects on the occupied and relatively poorly remunerated population strata, especially those linked to the informal sector. In this case, it is important to remember that the blacks &

browns are the most commonly found contingent in this situation.

➤ Between 1995 and 2006, the difference in the average incomes of the richest 10% and the 10% poorest among the whites, rose from 38.5 to 36.1 times, while among blacks & browns, it fell from 32.9 to 31 times. Among the whites, the difference between the richest 20% and the 20% poorest fell from 19.8 to 14.6 times. Among blacks & browns, it fell from 15.2 to 12.7 times.

➤ Decomposition of the income deciles of the occupied EAP, according to remuneration of the main employment, also reveals important aspects of the inequalities of colour or race and gender. Thus, in 1995, while black & brown men and women represented, in relative terms, 67.5% of the occupied contingent in the first income decile (the poorest), within the 10th income decile (the richest), the relative weight fell to 17.3%. In 2006, this scenario displayed a certain degree of improvement, at least compared with eleven years earlier. Thus, the relative weight of black & brown men and women in the first income decile, in 2006, fell to 66.9%, while, in the 10th income decile, it shifted to 21.4%.

➤ Upon specific analysis, the situation of the black & brown women, in 1995, represented 35.3% of the contingent that earned a level of remuneration lying within the first income decile. However, in 2006, this proportion remained practically stable (35.5%). At the other extreme, that is in the 10th income decile, the relative presence of black & brown women represented only 3.5% of the total of workers in this situation, having advanced positively in 2006 to 5.5%. Anyway, despite this positive evolution, its intensity was not sufficient to affirm decisively that it constituted a new trend reversing the situation.

➤ Among the children from 5 to 9, the participation rate of the whites fell from 2.4%, in 1995, to 1.1%, in 2006 (a fall of 54.2%). Among the blacks & browns, the fall was from 4.0% to 1.7% (a fall of 57.5%). However, the relative statistical weight of the black & brown children remained practically constant, with a slight rise from 63% to 64.4%. Among those aged 10 to 14, the participation rate in the labour market among the whites fell from 17.3% to 9.0%, while, among the blacks & browns, it fell, proportionally, from 23.5% to 12.2%. The relative weight of the black & brown youths in this age range in the worker contingent, increased proportionally from 58.1% to 60.6%. In the age range 15 - 17, the rates for the whites declined from 48.7% to 37.4%. Among the blacks & browns, the same rates fell from 53.3% to 41.2%. The relative weight of the black &

brown youths in this age range in the whole contingent, who participated in the labour market, rose from 52.4%, in 1995, to 55.3%, in 2006.

➤ In the white EAP, the relative weight of those who contributed to Social Security rose from 48.0% in 1995 to 52.2% in 2006. In the black & brown EAP, in the same period, the proportion of contributors rose from 31.0% to 36.8%. When this indicator is disaggregated by gender, in the white and black & brown male EAP, the percentage of contributors to Social Security, in the same year, were, respectively, 54.2% and 38.8%. In the female EAP, the percentages were 49.9% among the whites, and 34.1% among the blacks & browns. In other words, the female black & brown EAP constituted the worker group with greatest difficulty in contributing to Social Security, which, in other words, meant that 65% of the total of this contingent of women had no access to any form of protection / assistance on the part of the State.

➤ Between 1995 and 2006, among the elderly whites, the proportion of Social Security beneficiaries advanced positively from 75.7% to 78.2%, while, among the blacks & browns, it declined from 76.4% to 74.9%. Perhaps this evolution denotes that the alterations promoted in the general Social Security regime since the 1998 Constitutional Amendment no. 20/98, which, for the purposes of retirement, altered the calculation principle from service time to contribution time, have had negative effects on the asymmetries of colour or race.

➤ So that broad segments of the population can receive Social Security cover, a combination of diverse measures became necessary, for example, an increase in the formalization of labour relations, greater rigor in the inspection of employers contracting employees at the margin of the legislation (especially in the rural area, where the relative weight of the blacks & browns within the category of salary earners is significant), and major disbureaucratization of the legal requirements of micro and small firms. Besides this, and specifically bearing in mind the context of specific marginalization of blacks & browns in this type of public service, it is important to generate strategies to combat discrimination in the labour market, as well as adopt policies of affirmative action on the part of enterprises in both the public and private sectors.

➤ Regarding the same matter, it is opportune to mention that, although the asymmetry in life expectancy between whites and blacks & browns decreased over the period 1995 - 2005, it has left a perverse mark on the social security system. This occurs because different life expectancies imply different periods of benefit, besides

the impact of this indicator (life in specific age ranges) when calculating retirement pensions. Thus, if the average retirement age of the whites and blacks & browns, in 2006, were the same, analysis of the white pensioners presents an average age that is four years higher than that of the blacks & browns. Thus, given the practical invariability of incorporation of this phenomenon into the social security system, only complete equalisation of life expectancies of the colour or racial groups, in the whole country, could solve this problem.

➤ In general terms, after a period of decline in quality, the Brazilian labour market, after the period, 2000 - 2006, headed towards a certain improvement, with positive effects on the inequalities of colour or race. This was allowed by the aforementioned factors: I) context especially favourable to the world economy, which ended up stimulating the pace of economic activity in the national economy; II) the already commented policy to raise the purchasing power of the minimum salary; III) income transfer policies, for example, the Bolsa Família (family) and Bolsa Escola (school) programs, which increased the purchasing power of the poorer strata of the population, and, as a consequence, the blacks & browns; IV) credit expansion policies for lower and middle class families so as to increase their purchasing power; V) positive evolution of the average educational level of the occupied EAP, which contributed to the increase in average remuneration levels.

➤ It is worth pointing out that the theme of asymmetries of colour or race may be debated in the light of the evolution of the set of circumstances mentioned above. If it is true that the essential nucleus of the inequalities of colour or race turns out to be racism and the practice of racial discrimination, seen in their structural dimension, on the other hand, this cannot be synonymous with ignoring the effects that these economic policies, or the development of the economy, may bring to the stage of these inequalities. In other words, the different contexts of the evolution of the pace of economic activity and the different social policies will necessarily bring, in one way or another, more or less positive or negative effects on the colour or racial inequalities.

➤ If the universalist policies present limits on the achievement of the aspirations of racial equality, the adoption of policies of affirmative action in the labour market in the name of racial equality (including the gender perspective), may, nevertheless, encounter an atmosphere more or less favourable to potentialization of these measures. Thus, a development model pro-racial equality (or a pro-afro-descendent growth model) could

be generated through the combination of specific measures for promotion of equality and the constitution of a favourable global environment so that such a perspective is consolidated and expands. Assuming this reflection implies reporting the theme of inequalities of colour or race not only on the plane of distinct options of social policies, but giving equal attention to the question of different models for economic development.

8.5 Material Living Conditions of Colour or Racial Groups

➤ In 2006, the disaggregation of the deciles of household income per capita according to colour or racial groups, reveals that the white population increased its relative presence in the higher deciles, while the blacks & browns registered a greater relative presence in the lower deciles, that is, the poorest. Thus, throughout Brazil, the whites totalled 26.5% of persons in the first decile, whereas 73% were blacks & browns. The latter contingent was 23.5 percentage points higher than their presence in the population as a whole. However, the majority of the 10th decile was composed of whites (78%), the relative weight of the blacks & browns being 20.4%, 29.1 percentage points lower than their presence in the total population.

➤ In 2006, 8% of the white population and 18.8% of the black & brown population were below the destitution line. It is worth stressing that, from 1995 to 2006, the proportion of the population below the destitution line gradually decreased for both contingents of colour or race. In this period, the percentage of destitution decreased 3.5 percentage points among the white population, and 9.5 percentage points among the blacks & browns. Thus, there occurred a reduction in the asymmetries, from 16.8 percentage points in 1995 to 10.9 percentage points in 2006. In 1995, 32.9% of the destitute were whites, and 66.7%, blacks & browns. In 2006, the whites were 29.6% and the blacks & browns, 69.8% of the population in a state of absolute poverty. Therefore, in the period from 1995 to 2006, there was an increase of 3.1 percentage points in the relative participation of the blacks & browns among the population below the destitution line. This apparently contradictory shift is attributed to the changes in composition of colour or race in the population in this period, as seen in the second chapter.

➤ In 2006, in the whole country, 43.6% of the blacks & browns and 21.6% of the whites were below the poverty line. Among the whites, the decrease was 6.3 percentage points in relative terms, representing a fall of 22.6%. Among the blacks & browns, the figure was 11

percentage points, a fall of 20.3%. In other words, there was a reduction of 4.7 percentage points in the colour or race differences. Between 1995 and 2006, there was also an increase in the relative participation of the blacks & browns in the population below the poverty line, of 4.7 percentage points. In 1995, the population below the poverty line was composed of 61.4% blacks & browns, and, in 2006, 66.1%. Once again, what explains these apparently contradictory shifts are the alterations observed in the relative weights of the different colour or racial groups in the population in the period.

➤ In 2004, 11.6% of the households headed by whites, and 25.1% of those headed by blacks & browns received some type of monetary benefit through policies to combat poverty and hunger. In 2006, the proportion of beneficiaries was 11.4% among the whites, and 26% among the blacks & browns.

➤ In 2006, the percentages of households headed by blacks & browns and received some type of government benefit in the form of income transfer were: Bolsa-Família [Family Income Support], 21.7%; other government-run social programs, 2.9%; Benefício de Prestação Continuada – Lei Orgânica da Assistência Social - BPC-LOAS [Benefit for an Indefinite Period], 2.8%; and Programa de Erradicação do Trabalho Infantil-Juvenil – Pete [Child-Youth Labour Eradication Program], 0.7%. Among the households headed by whites, the percentages were: Bolsa-Família, 8.7%; other government social programs 1.6%; BPC-LOAS, 1.7%; and PETI, 0.3%.

➤ The distribution in the five regions of the country of households benefited by the government income transfer programs, according to the colour or race of the head, reveals that the Northeast was the modal region for both groups. However, the distribution was not rigorously identical for whites and blacks & browns. In the case of the latter group, of the households benefited by this type of financial assistance, 55.2% were in the Northeast, 22.3% in the Southeast, and 11.1% in the North, the remaining 11.3% in the regions, Centre-West and South. In the case of the white population, the relative weight of households benefited by the income transfer programs in the five regions were: Northeast, 37.7%; Southeast, 31.3%; South, 18%; and the others 13.1%, distributed among the Centre-West and North regions.

➤ The composition of colour or race of the head in the total of households benefited by a government income transfer program, showed that the majority of those who receive the assistance were blacks & browns. This

happened as much in 2004 (64.6%) as in 2006 (67.6%). In the latter year, the relative presence of the households headed by blacks & browns in the population benefited by these programs was: Bolsa-Familia, 69.4%; PETI, 68.3%; other government-run social programs, 62.8%; and BPC-LOAS, 59.9%.

➤ With regard to the average household income per capita, in coherence with the mode of distribution of the benefits among the colour or racial groups, it is perceived that the government policies for income transfer contributed, in the whole country, in 2006, to a 15.4% reduction in the asymmetries between the groups. In the interior of the five regions, the contribution of these policies to the fall in inequalities of the average household incomes per capita among those of colour or white and black & brown race, was: North, 31.9%; Northeast, 25.8%; Centre-West, 14.2%; South, 12.3%; and Southeast, 10.8%.

➤ Throughout Brazil, in 2006, the income transfers did not result in large contributions to the percentage reduction of persons below the poverty line. The fall in the relative number of poor was 3.1 percentage points among the whites, and 5.6 percentage points among the blacks & browns. However, when one observes the effects of government income transfer policies on the percentage of the population below the destitution line, it is perceived that the alterations were positively more significant. With the transfers, there was an estimated fall in the relative number of destitute among whites and blacks & browns, respectively, 5.4 and 12 percentage points. In the large regions, the effects of these government policies on the percentage of poor and destitute invariably benefited the blacks & browns to a greater extent.

➤ It became evident that, in the policies to guarantee a minimum income, the black & brown population was a special public target, and represented a clear majority among those benefited. Thus, as much as it can be argued that such a conclusion is obvious, given that it is precisely the blacks & browns who were the most affected by poverty, naturally, they should be the first to be assisted by income transfer actions, but this logic has not always appeared in the history of social policies. Traditionally, the lack of vision about the demands and problems of the afro-descendants almost always excluded them from the beneficial actions, even when identified as the most needy. Perhaps what occurred throughout the 20th century in the educational system was the most perfect example of this exclusion. Therefore, the fact the current policies of income transfer focused on the blacks & browns as the most

important sector of the public is not of the least relevance.

➤ However, as relevant as those measures may have been, it also becomes necessary to point out their risks. It is impossible not to notice that most of the government policies for income transfer, and the public benefited do not possess a legal or constitutional character, unlike, for example, BPC-LOAS, guaranteed by the Constitution and not dependent on the government or any arrangement of party forces. Unfortunately, it is not the case of Bolsa-Familia or similar, dependent on policy decisions and budget forecasts that cannot be maintained. It is not difficult to calculate the degree of insecurity of the beneficiaries of a line of action that can be withdrawn or maintained on the whim of the political or economic scenario. Or worse, there could be exploitation of this insecurity as a mechanism to preserve a relation of dependence of the society on the State. The citizen, already completely deprived of the capacity to criticize and act politically, would become a defenceless pawn in the arrangement of party forces established in each context.

➤ Thus, no matter how beneficial they have been in the short and medium terms, it is fundamental that the government policies for income transfer be regulated, including full definition of the criteria for allocation of benefits and mechanisms to guarantee greater entrepreneurial capacity for the beneficiaries, generating economically and socially sustainable alternatives for the future, where action for the empowerment of the afro-descendent population would be essential. Otherwise, there will be risk of a perverse switch from economic poverty/destitution to political poverty, to the detriment of the black population in particular.

➤ In 2005, the Human Development Index - HDI of the blacks & browns (0.753) was situated at a level between those of Iran and Paraguay, or 95th in the world ranking. On the other hand, the HDI for whites (0.838) corresponds to that of Cuba, in 51st position. The HDI for blacks & browns, in 2005, corresponded to a country with a medium level of human development, 25 positions below Brazil in the PNUD ranking. The whites, in the same year, appeared to have an HDI equivalent to that of a country with high human development, 19 positions above the same Brazilian placing. As a consequence, in the PNUD ranking, the HDI of the two groups was separated by 44 positions.

➤ Between 1995 and 2005, the HDIs of whites and blacks & browns advanced positively at different paces,

reducing the distances separating the two groups. In that first year, the HDI of the white population was high, 0.800. From 1995 to 2005, the HDI of the white group grew 4.8%. In the case of the black & brown contingent, the HDI in 1995 was 0.680, rising to a value over 0.700 in 1998. Between 1995 and 2005, the HDI of blacks & browns grew 10.7%, which was, therefore, 5.9 percentage points above that of the white contingent. For this reason, between 1997 and 2005, the gaps between the two groups, measured by the HDI ranking of the United Nations Development Program - UNDP countries, decreased by twenty positions.

➤ According to the Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios – PNAD [National Household Research by Sampling], performed by the Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística – IBGE [Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics] in 2006, in the whole country, 95.9% of the households headed by whites possessed an adequate system of access to water. In the households headed by blacks & browns, this index was 85.3%. In other words, the relative weight of the households with white and black & brown heads that did not have an adequate water supply were, respectively, 4.1% and 14.7%. Thus, in the latter group, the lack of access was three times worse. In proportional terms, in 1995, the difference in access to potable water between the two groups was 35%, while, in 2006, it declined to 12.4%.

➤ In the whole country, in 2006, of the households that had white heads, 79.2% had an adequate sewage system. In the case of blacks & browns, the respective percentage was 60.7%. In the same year, inadequate sanitation was observed in 20.8% of the households headed by whites and in 39.3% of those headed by blacks & browns. Analysis of the behaviour of the indicator, from 1995 to 2006, among the colour or racial groups, shows a reduction in the inequalities. In 1995, the difference between the percentage of households headed by whites in comparison to those headed by blacks & browns, was 58.6%. In 2006, the same disparity fell to 30.4%. It is worth commenting that the percentage of households headed by blacks & browns with access to an adequate sewage disposal system, in 2006, was still 10.2 percentage points lower than that of the whites, 11 years earlier, 1995.

➤ With regard to the sanitation system, it was verified that its expansion and the reduction in inequalities of colour or race advanced in a more timid form in comparison to the other public services. Perhaps this movement denotes a low preordination of the public authorities, which corresponds to a perverse inversion of the potentialities of the generation of social benefits with

the consolidation of the democratic system. This is because it is often argued that investment in basic sanitation, by virtue of being subterranean and invisible, does not lead to votes. However, even this common understanding needs to be treated with caution. The effects of proactive measures in the sanitation area provides undeniable beneficial effects for the environment, the quality of beaches and other leisure spaces, no least for public health. In fact, nothing can justify the absence of a national plan for basic sanitation, which, if effectively implemented, would have positive consequences for the afro-descendent population, the most adversely affected in this respect.

➤ In the possession of sophisticated consumer durables, such as a fridge, washing machine and a fixed line telephone, it was verified that the differences between colour or white racial groups and the blacks & browns remained high. In 1995, 21.7% of the white households possessed a fridge, while, among blacks & browns, this same proportion was 6.6%. In 2006, possession of a fridge was found in 22.1% of white households, and in 10.1% of the black & brown. In the same year, the white households with a washing machine totalled 50.1%, while the black & brown percentage was 23.3%.

➤ In the whole country, in 2001, the households headed by whites and possessing a computer was 18%; with access to Internet, 12.6%; and with a mobile phone, 38.1%. By 2006, the same indicators had evolved thus: possession of a computer, 30.8%; access to Internet, 24.3%; and possession of a mobile phone, 70.4%. In the households headed by blacks & browns, lower entry into the digital world was verified. In 2001, 5.2% possessed a computer; 3% had access to the Internet; and 21.6% a mobile phone. In 2006, the indicators were as follows: possession of a computer, 12.2%; access to Internet, 8.3%; and a mobile phone, 55.8%.

➤ Of the total agricultural establishments run by whites, the status of owner represented 75.5%, and that of assignee, 8.2%. In the same contingent, 7.3% occupied the land as a partner, and 6.6% as a tenant. Finally, squatters, holding land in a more precarious situation, represented 1.2%. Also in 2006, among the blacks & browns, the relative weight of ownership reached 59.9%. The assignees, in turn, reached 14.2%. Status as a partner represented 10.2% of the agricultural establishments, and tenant, 7.5%. Finally, the squatters constituted 5.1%.

➤ In terms of composition of the forms of land occupation, according to colour or white and black & brown racial groups, it is verified that, in 2006, the blacks

& browns represented 49.2% of the owners, 67.8% of the assignees, 83.8% of the squatters, 58% of the tenants and 63.1% of those who worked in a partnership regime.

➤ In 1995, 34.6% of the white owners of agricultural establishments could be considered smallholders, and, in 2006, the percentage reached 37.4%. Among the blacks & browns, in the same period, these rural establishments decreased from 64.6% to 61.5%.

➤ There is a long latent reflection between the themes of policies to promote racial equality and democratization of access to land via agrarian reform. It is regrettable that a country that denies this access to the descendants of former slaves does not have a more consistent tradition of link between the two agendas. The lack of statistical databases that would allow this type of cross-matching, in fact reflects the conceptual limits that still exist in this ambit. Even so, the few indicators that are available show that, in comparison to the whites, in the agricultural system, the blacks & browns suffer more due to their subjection to antiquated occupational relations. In the lack of legal possession of the asset, the worker is obliged to forego part of his production in favour of the legal landowners or live with the permanent uncertainty of being able to remain in this activity. The lack of sufficient land area to guarantee material support for the family also affected the black & brown rural producers more in proportional terms.

8.6. Access to Institutional Power, Public Policies and Application/Interpretation of the Legislation

➤ Since the resumption of civilian rule after the military regime, few persons of conspicuous African descendency have reached positions in the higher echelons of the federal government. In the Sarney government (1985-1989) there was one; in the Collor government (1990-1992), apart from his spokesman, who did not have ministerial status, none; in the Itamar Franco government (1992-1994), once again, none; one in the Fernando Henrique Cardoso government (1995-2002); five in the first and current mandate of the Lula government, at the beginning of 2008.

➤ At present, there are two federal government organs dedicated primarily to policies for promotion of racial equality: Fundação Cultural Palmares and SEPPPIR. Fundação Cultural Palmares is an organ linked to the Ministry of Culture. SEPPPIR also covers the following institutions: CNPIR [National Board for the Promotion of Racial Equality] and the Fórum Intergovernamental de Promoção da Igualdade Racial - FIPIR

[Intergovernmental Forum for the Promotion of Racial Equality]. CNPIR is formed of 40 members: 17 representatives drawn from civil society, 17 representing an equal number of ministries and three persons of recognized influence in the afro-descendent population.

➤ FIPIR co-ordinates federal, state and municipal government organs that articulate the policies to promote racial equality in the three institutions. Adhesion to FIPIR, however, is voluntary. By the end of 2007, the forum had received adhesion from 25 of the states, Paraná State and the Federal District being exceptions. 204 municipalities in the whole country also adhered to FIPIR (3.7% of the total of 5.564 at the end of 2007). Of these, 16 were capitals (only in São Luiz did no specific organ exist to promote policies of this nature). In institutional terms, there were 190 specific organs or with incumbency for dealing with the matter of promoting racial equality at municipal level. In absolute terms, the State that counted on the greatest number of adhesions from municipalities was Maranhão, with 60. Next came São Paulo (25), Bahia (18), Goiás (18, not including the capital, Goiânia) and Rio de Janeiro (19, capital also not included). Of these 25 states, three did not enjoy adherence of any municipality: Acre, Paraíba and Roraima. In Alagoas, Amazonas, Piauí, Rondônia and Tocantins, only one municipality adhered. In Paraná, which still did not adhere to FIPIR, only the municipality of Maringá took this initiative.

➤ In the survey carried out by the LAESER team, of the 513 federal deputies elected in 2006, there were 11 coloured or of black race; 10 men and 1 woman. Among browns, 35 were identified; 33 men and 2 women. In total, there were 46 deputies; 43 men and 3 women. In relative terms, the weights of these parliamentarians in the Câmara dos Deputados [Chamber of Deputies] were 2.1% blacks, and 6.8% browns. Together, the two groups represented 9% of the total number of federal deputies, this contingent representing 49.5% of the population in 2006. On the other hand, those identified as whites represented 87%, the yellows, 0.8%, and unclassified, 3.3%. No federal deputy identified himself as indigenous.

➤ Comparing the relative proportion among the elected in the five geographical regions with the relative weight in the population, the following situation was found in 2006: I) North - blacks & browns formed 75.4% of the population and 7.7% of the total number of federal deputies; II) Northeast - 70.4% of the population and 5.3% of the deputies; III) Southeast - 40.2% of the population and 12.8% of the deputies; IV) South - 19.7% of the population and 5.2% of the deputies;

Centre-West - 56.2% of the population and 14.6% of the deputies.

➤ Another contingent clearly underrepresented in the Chamber of Deputies is women, who were just 8.8% of the total number of elected federal deputies in 2006. Curiously, this was almost the same proportion found for blacks & browns. Specifically considering black women, there was only one deputy (0.2% of the total). Among the browns, the situation was not much better: only two, equivalent to 0.4%. In the total, the blacks & browns represented 0.6% of the elected deputies throughout the country, in 2006. The weight of the blacks & browns in the population, in the same year, was 24.8%.

➤ In every party the whites were the majority. Thus, mentioning only the significant ones, the figures were as follows: PMDB, 93.3%; PT, 83.1%; PSDB, 92.4%; PFL, 86.2%; PTB, 95.5%; PDT, 87.5%; PPS, 81.8%; and PSB, 96.3%.

➤ Another extremely relevant question is the educational profile of the federal deputies. Among the whites, there was a higher percentage of bearers of further education diplomas: 83.6%. The blacks represented 54.5%, the browns, 71.4%, and the yellows, 75%. It is observed that 80% of the parliamentarians possessed complete higher education, and at least 7.4%, incomplete. Thus, comparing these data with those of the federal deputies who are white (86.9%) and male (91.2%), it seems that one finally reaches the standard profile of the parliamentarian in the contemporary period.

➤ At the beginning of 2007, 76 of the 81 senators (93.8%) were whites, while only 4 were browns, and one black. Therefore, the black & brown senators totalled only 6.2%. Besides this, all 10 female senators (12.3%) were white. The only black senator was from the South, and there was just one brown from each of the other four regions.

➤ Of the 68 judges in the Supreme Court, two blacks and two yellows were identified, all of them men, but there was not one brown. The other 64 judges of the higher courts were white, 56 being men and 12 women.

➤ At the beginning of 2008, the records of self-definition certificates held at Fundação Cultural Palmares indicated the existence of 989 lands remaining from former *quilombos* (fugitive slave settlements), occupied by 1,200 communities. Therefore, of the total number of communities (3,224), estimated by Secretaria Especial de

Promoção de Políticas de Igualdade Racial - SEPPIR, a government organ linked to the Presidency, only 37.2% were on the institution's register.

➤ In 2008, of the recognized lands settled by remnant *quilombo* communities, 23% were in Bahia; 11%, in Maranhão; 8.9%, in Minas Gerais; 8.2%, in Pará; and 8%, in Pernambuco. Thus, the five largest states with remnant *quilombo* communities represented 59.1% of the total number of recognized communities.

➤ By the end of 2006, 89 lands occupied by 145 remnant *quilombo* communities were issued deeds. It was in the North region that the largest proportion was found between the number of communities issued land titles and the estimated number: 17.3%. In the other regions, the proportions were: 4.6% in the Centre-West; 2.2% in the Northeast; 1.9% in the Southeast; and 0% in the South.

➤ What draws attention is the low proportion of communities issued property titles in relation to those estimated in the states of greater concentration of remnant *quilombo* communities. Thus, in Pará, the proportion was 21.3%, the largest in the whole country. In the other states of greater concentration of *quilombo* remnants: Mato Grosso, 8.1%; São Paulo, 5.6%; Maranhão, 3.5%; Pernambuco, 1.7%; Bahia, 0.9%; and Minas Gerais, 0.4%.

➤ Analysing the proportion among the number of remnant *quilombo* community lands contained in the Fundação Cultural Palmares register and those at least partially legalised (in other words, certified even with the existence of some type legal contestation), it is observed that 14.7% of the communities recognized by this foundation had legal possession of the land, if only partly regularized. If, instead of the number of communities, the reference adopted, were lands issued deeds, the proportion would fall to 9%.

➤ By the end 2007, the states of Pará and Maranhão concentrated 69.6% of the total number of regularised remnant *quilombo* community lands. What also arouse attention is the low proportion of regularised lands in relation to the total number of such lands in states where *quilombos* were common, such as Bahia, Pernambuco and Mato Grosso.

➤ At present, there are over 10,082 families settled on the 89 former *quilombo* lands already issued deeds. At a rough estimate based on six persons per family, in these areas, the total population amounts to 60,492. The states

of Pará, Maranhão and Bahia together represent 69.7% of the total number of former *quilombo* families occupying legalised properties.

➤ Since 1995, 874,100 hectares of land have been allocated to permanent settlement of populations self-defined as remnant *quilombo* communities. Most of these areas are located in Pará, which, alone, contains 52.8% of the total. Goiás ranks in second place with 29% of the total regularised *quilombo* lands already occupied by the Kalungas community, whose interior areas are, in fact, inhabited by another 41 communities, spread across three municipalities: Cavalcante, Monte Alegre and Teresina de Goiás.

➤ During the two President Fernando Henrique Cardoso mandates, 51 remnant *quilombo* community lands were issued deeds, thereby benefiting 7,432 families on a total land area of 736 thousand hectares. From 2003 to 2007, the period covered by President Lula's mandate, 38 communities of former *quilombos*, comprising 2,650 families on 137 thousand hectares, received land titles. From 1995 to 2007, on average, former remnant *quilombo* community lands were issued deeds at the rate of 6.9 per year. Considering the demand for deeds, this number appears extremely modest.

➤ Since 1995, 14 ministries or secretariats, including subordinate organs, have already scheduled specific budgets for action aimed at the afro-descendent population or racial equality, as follows: Agriculture, Fisheries, Science and Technology, Culture, Agrarian Development, Social Development, Education, Sport, Justice, the Environment, Foreign Affairs, Health, SEPPPIR, Work and Employment, and Tourism.

➤ Calculating the corresponding authorized amounts, corrected by the Índice Nacional de Preços ao Consumidor Amplo – IPCA [Consumer Price Index] to December 2007 values, in 1995, the LOA [Annual Federal Budget] authorized R\$587,103 for policy action to the benefit of the black population or promotion of racial equality, fully allocated to the Ministry of Culture. In 1999 and 2002 (the first and last years of President Fernando Henrique Cardoso's second mandate), the budgets earmarked for action with the same aim were, respectively, R\$2,567,832 and R\$24,176,066. In 2003, the first year of the Lula government, the budget authorized was R\$13,884,337, reaching R\$196,269,396 in 2007.

➤ Therefore, the amounts allotted to these policies grew exponentially in the period. It is curious that, from 1995 to 2007, a total of R\$ 614,988,011 was authorized. Despite this significant amount, in absolute terms, it

corresponded to a mere 0.1% of the total authorized by that set of ministries and respective organs.

➤ Upon analysis of how much of the budget for these actions were effectively executed, the figures are found to be far less. Thus, calculating using correction by the IPCA inflation index to December 2007 values, in 1995, the amount was R\$542,365, 92.4% of the total authorized. In 1999 and 2002, respectively, 94.5% (R\$2,427,339) and 28.4% (R\$6,857,769). In 2003, the amount reached 39.7% (R\$5,509,763), and, in 2007, 76.8% (R\$150,806,139). From 1995 to 2007, the allocations effectively spent on actions to benefit the black population or in the name of racial equality totalled R\$426,384,261, once again corresponding to 0.1% of the whole budget. In the same period, R\$188,603,750 ceased to be spent on these actions. In the Fernando Henrique Cardoso government (1995 - 2002), the difference between the sums authorized and actually applied totalled R\$24.7 million. Thus, the budget execution represented 61.7% of the total. On the other hand, in the first five years of the Lula mandate (2003 - 2007), the difference was R\$163.9 million, equivalent to 70.2% of the sum authorized.

➤ In the last few years, the main allocation of the funds was to remnant *quilombo* communities. Thus, as of 1996, the first year of inclusion in the budget, to 2007, there occurred an exponential increase in the amount of funds, in real terms, at December 2007 values, from R\$4.8 million to R\$147.6 million. On the other hand, the allocated funds effectively expended for this purpose were also lower: R\$2.5 million in 1995, and R\$110.6 million in 2007. Thus, in the total scheduled funds from 1996 to 2007, R\$ 395.6 million, the percentage of budget execution was 68.4%. The reason for this mismatch lies in the actions to regularize and issue deeds for the remnant *quilombo* community lands.

➤ Considering only the prime actions of Fundação Cultural Palmares, from 1995 to 2007, R\$131.4 million were allocated, 58.8% being duly expended. Per period of government, in the Fernando Henrique Cardoso mandate, Fundação Cultural Palmares received a total allotment of R\$59.3 million, of which 63.1% was spent. In the current Lula mandate, Fundação Cultural Palmares had a budget of R\$72 million at its disposal, 55.3% of which has been expended.

➤ Regarding the SEPPPIR budget, the amount authorized, from its establishment to the end of 2007, was R\$111.5 million, 68.8% having been spent. Taking into account only their prime actions, the total sum

authorized, from 2004 to 2007, was R\$80.2 million, 59.3% having been expended.

➤ In Brazil, there are 11 official national holidays, six being on the Christian calendar (specifically, that of the Apostolic Roman Catholic Church) and five civic dates (see Chart 7.5). Dia Nacional da Consciência Negra [National Black Consciousness Day] still does not constitute a national holiday. Even so, according to SEPPPIR, up to November 2007, 258 of the 5,561 municipalities in the whole country (4.6% of the total) had adopted the date as a holiday. These municipalities are distributed thus: Alagoas (one municipality out of a total of 102); Goiás (1 out of 246); Minas Gerais (one out of 853); Mato Grosso (as it is a state holiday, all 141); Pará (2 out of 143); Paraíba (2 out of 223); Pernambuco (1 out of 185); Rio de Janeiro (as it is a state holiday, all 92); Rondônia (1 out of 52); Sergipe (2 out of 75); and São Paulo (21, including the capital, out of 645). Although of the two largest capitals (São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro) have adopted the date as a commemorative holiday, it is notable that 90.2% of the total number of municipalities with an identical initiative were concentrated in Mato Grosso and Rio de Janeiro, which is far from being widespread throughout the country.

➤ Up to April 2008, in the whole country, only six Candomblé (Afro-Brazilian religion) centres were listed by IPHAN as cultural heritage, five in Salvador and one in São Luiz. Just in Rio de Janeiro, the number of listed catholic churches reached 23, which, when other assets are considered, for example, frontispieces of old churches, chapels, sacerdotal residences and religious works of art, the number of properties listed, increased the figure to 41.

➤ With regard to the effective application of article 216º V, § 5º of the Federal Constitution: All documents and sites bearing historical reminiscence to former *quilombos* shall be listed as heritage; there are two listed historical sites in the country. The first is Serra da Barriga, in the municipality, União dos Palmares (AL), where *Quilombo dos Palmares* was located. The other archaeological site is that of the 18th century *Quilombo de Ambrósio*, situated in Ibiá (MG), listed on 15th January 2002. The positive nature of this measure, does not, however, compensate for the lack of listings of other historical sites in places that had previously been occupied by *quilombos*. For example, just in Minas Gerais, from 1710 to 1798, it is estimated that there existed 160 communities of this nature.

➤ Information was compiled on the outcomes of civil and criminal cases concerning racism and the practice of

racial discrimination in 13 courts: Federal District, Goiás, Maranhão, Mato Grosso, Mato Grosso do Sul, Minas Gerais, Pará, Paraná, Pernambuco, Rio de Janeiro, Rio Grande do Sul, Santa Catarina and São Paulo. The period of analysis was from 1st January 2005 to 31st December 2006. The database covered 85 cases.

➤ Concerning the outcomes of second instance appeals in civil or criminal cases related to claims of racism, it is perceived that 40% of the cases were judged as groundless. However, the claimants were reserved the right of appeal, a new chance to defend their rights. Overall, in practice, this has meant that 35.3% of the cases were eventually won, and 14.1% were deemed to bear partial grounds. Thus, around 49% of the claimants, in the period under study, won rather than lost.

➤ Upon analysis of the decisions of the second instance judgments, it was verified that the victims of the crime of racism won 32.9% of the cases, while the accused won in 57.7%. This shows that, in the second instance, the accused have been at an advantage, in the sense of reversing first instance decisions.